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decision becomes quite acceptable when the real impediment to progress - the abolition of capital punishment - is removed. If this alternative were adopted, the defense of insanity would then be raised,
not to free the accused but to determine whether he should be confined for the protection of society or given medical treatment and
rehabilitated. The acceptance of this latter approach, however, is
contingent upon man's readiness to emerge into a new era of civilization and to quash his medieval craving for revenge.
LEON C. STROMIRE
ROBERT

T.

WESTMAN

STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS
With the surge of business activity in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the utilization of the corporation as the favorite
business organization came stockholders often far removed from the
corporation and ill informed as to its management, who were increasingly abused by those who managed the vast amounts of capital
the stockholders provided. The resulting evils cried out for a remedy.
One cure for these evils has been through legislation aimed at
broader control and regulation of business and management by governmental agencies. Crusaders such as Charles Evans Hughes have
sought to purge the business community of the irresponsible and
criminal elements and at the same time strengthen business., Another
answer, developed in the courts of equity, is the stockholders' derivative suit, which allows the shareholder to become the watchdog of
his own interests. The latter solution is a helpful, but imperfect,
means by which individual, minority holders of stock can correct the
more glaring abuses of corporate trust by bringing suit for the corporation when it is unable to act because of the control exerted over
it by the evildoers or their cohorts.
When an officer or director misappropriates or misapplies corporate funds, the corporation has a cause of action against him for
the breach of his fiduciary duty. If the corporation fails to exercise
its rights, an individual stockholder, after making a demand on the
corporation to do so, has the right to sue in equity on the corporate
11 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 132 (1951).
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cause of action.2 The suit is brought in the name of the shareholder
for the benefit of the corporation, and all benefits flow to it.3 The corporation must be joined in the suit,4 and final judgment is res judicata
as to the corporation and its shareholders. 5
Although it is often difficult for the shareholder to discover that
the corporation is being wronged, to obtain specific information about
the misdeeds, and to finance this expensive litigation, the hundreds of
appellate reports involving stockholders' derivative suits are ample
testimony to the fact that this remedy is regarded as both useful and
helpful. Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court,
in 1948, gave a brief summary of the growth and importance of the
stockholders' derivative suit:"
"As business enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of
incorporation, management became vested with almost uncontrolled discretion in handling other people's money. The
vast aggregate of funds ... came to be drawn... from numerous and scattered holders of small interests. The director was
not subject to an effective accountability. That created strong
temptation for managers to profit personally at expense of
their trust. . . . [AInd stockholders, in face of gravest abuses,
were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of
trust.
"Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no
standing to bring civil action at law against faithless directors
and managers.... This remedy ... was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders'
interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it
there would be little practical check on such abuses."
2Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale,
107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y.
7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
3Young v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 204 (1945); Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac.
312 (1915); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
4E.g., Hyamo v. Old Dominion Co., 204 Fed. 681 (D. Me. 1913); Greenwood v.
Greenblatt, 173 Ga. 551, 161 S.E. 135 (1931); Smith v. Rader, 31 Idaho 423, 173
Pac. 970 (1918).
5E.g., Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Rys. and Union Stockyards Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 656, 25 Ad. 277 (Ch. 1892);
Hearst v. Putnam Mining Co., 28 Utah 184, 77 Pac. 753 (1904).
GCohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
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Although litigation by abused owners of stock can be found in the
reports of almost every state, the bulk of such cases has arisen in the
industrial Northeast. In Florida the number of cases to reach the appellate courts has been relatively small; most of the cases have arisen
since 1930. However, as the state continues to grow and the business
community becomes more complex, the stockholders' derivative suit
will become increasingly important. There are a number of problems inherent in this type of suit. A realization of these problems,
before they are manifested in Florida litigation, and their possible
solution is of practical importance.
PREREQUISITES FOR BRINGING SUIT

There are usually three prerequisites to a stockholders' derivative
suit: (1) ownership of shares in the corporation, 7 (2) prior exhaustion
of remedies within the corporation, 8 and (3) a wrong that is actionable in equity. 9 Not only must these three be present but they must
also be specifically alleged in the complaint.1o Two other prerequisites are occasionally advanced - proper motive on the part of the
plaintiff-shareholder and security in advance for the expense of litigation. The latter is required by statute in a number of states."
Ownership of Shares
The requirement that the plaintiff-shareholder own shares of stock
in the corporation on whose cause of action he is suing is not a surprising prerequisite. However, it does raise two important questions:
(1) What kind of ownership is necessary, and (2) must the shares be
owned prior to accrual of the cause of action?

7E.g., H. F. G. Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947); Rosenthal
v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 326 Del. 99, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948); News-Journal Corp. v.

Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941).
SE.g., Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887); Miller v. Murray, 17 Colo. 408, 30
Pac. 46 (1892); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674
(1932).
9

Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Orlando Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla.
159. 161 So. 284 (1935); Glassberg v. Boyd, 116 A.2d 711 (Del. 1955).
'oFD. R. Civ. P. 23 (b); Brensinger v. Margaret Ann Super Markets, Inc., 192
F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1951); Greenwood v. Greenblatt, 173 Ga. 551, 161 S.E. 135 (1931).
"E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §834 (1953); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §61 (b) (Supp. 1957).
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The right to sue is extended to both common1 2 and preferred's
shareholders who are legal owners of record.14 The majority of states
also permit an equitable, nonrecord owner to maintain a derivative
suit, since he is suing in equity for an equitable remedy. 15 The more
recent federal decisions allow a nonrecord owner to bring suit; earlier
federal cases followed the contrary rule.' 6 If, in fact, there is a conflict on this point between the federal court and the law of the state of
incorporation, there is a question as to which governs.' 7 This seems to
be clearly a matter of substance; under Erie Railroadv. Tompkins-8 it
should be controlled by state law.
Ownership must continue until institution of suit;19 otherwise
there would be no reason to sue, for the plaintiff would not be interested in a decree the benefit of which flowed to the corporation.
Also a majority of jurisdictions, including Florida, require ownership
of stock at the time the wrong was committed.20 This rule prevails
12Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948); NewsJournal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941); Polish Amer. Pub. Co. v.
Wojcik, 280 Mich. 466, 273 N.W. 771 (1937).
'-Schmid v. Ballard, 175 Minn. 138, 220 N.W. 423 (1928); Osann v. Jones, 209
App. Div. 9, 204 N.Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dep't 1924); Warren Tel. Co. v. Staton, 46
Ohio App. 505, 189 N.E. 660 (1933).
14FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 (b); News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, supra note 12; Bookman
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 116, 30 A.2d 823 (Ch. 1943).
15See Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. 299, 312, 60 A.2d 106, 111 (Ch.
1948). See also Mills Dev. Corp. v. Shipp & Head, Inc., 126 Fla. 490, 171 So. 533
(1936).
16See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.17 (1948).
'17See Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941); Bankers Nat'l Corp. v.
Barr, 7 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). But see H. F. G. Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162
F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947) (one judge concurring on basis of Illinois law and
differing on the point here raised).
8304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'oPolish Amer. Pub. Co. v. Wojcik, 280 Mich. 466, 273 N.W. 771 (1937); Hanna
v. Lyon, 179 N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 778 (1904). But see Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1954), which ruled that FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (I) does not apply to suits
by shareholders to recover short-swing profits as provided in the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. This act provides for suit by any shareholder and therefore
supersedes the rule.
20E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (b); Rosenthal v. Burry Corp., 30 Del. 299, 60 A.2d
106 (Ch. 1948); News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941).
Several other jurisdictions have within recent years repudiated their prior position
and by statute now require ownership at the time of the wrongdoing. See CAL.
CoRP. CODE §834 (a) (1) (1951); DEL. CODE ANN. §325 (b) (1953); N. Y. GEN. CoRn.
LAW §61 (1946). But see Pardon v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 So. 788 (1891); Fortner
v. Cornell, 66 Idaho 512, 163 P.2d 299 (1945).
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even though in many cases an after-acquiring owner would benefit
through the enhanced worth of the corporation if it did, in fact, recover. The effect of the minority rule, which allows an after-acquiring
owner to bring a derivative suit, is to allow individuals to buy into
the corporation for the purpose of harassing management or for
motives of personal gain through settlements with the accused
officers. 21 The majority rule is followed by the federal courts because
it prevents persons from obtaining diversity of citizenship for federal
jurisdiction by having a citizen of another state buy into the corporation and bring suit in a federal court. 22 Undoubtedly, the inflexible application of this requirement operates to exclude shareholders from bringing suit who purchased their shares without
knowledge of the wrongdoing and who have a legitimate interest in
seeing funds returned. Yet, to the extent that the above evils cannot
be otherwise prevented, this rule serves a useful purpose.
There is a question whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
(b) (1), which requires ownership of stock at the time of the wrong,
is procedural or substantive. If it is procedural, it will apply in diversity of citizenship cases; if substantive, Erie23 will apply and the
appropriate state law will be followed. The Advisory Committee on
Rules for the United States Supreme Court in its Final Draft of
Amendments of 1946 recognized the question of whether this rule
is substantive or procedural and made this recommendation:24
"[Tihe question is a debatable one, and . .. there is respectable authority for either view, with a recent trend towards
the view that rule 23 (b) (1) is procedural .... [Tihe question
is one which should not be decided by the Supreme Court
ex parte, but left to await a judicial decision in a litigated
case .... "
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b) (1) and some state procedural rules allow a plaintiff-shareholder to sue, even though he
owned no shares when the cause of action accrued, if "his shares there2xThis possibility has been greatly limited by courts requiring the plaintiffshareholder to pay any settlement over to the corporation. This is discussed under
heading "Dismissal and Settlement" infra.
22Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909).
22304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24ADVISORY

COMM.

ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 80TH CONG.,

IST SEss.,

REPORT

OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 73 (1946).
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after devolved on him by operation of law." What the term operation
of law includes is not altogether certain; however, several states
have interpreted it to allow the executor of a shareholder who dies
during the pendency of the suit to continue the litigation. 25
Exhaustion of Remedies
The cause of action upon which the stockholders' derivative suit
is based is one that has accrued to the corporation. The individual
shareholder has a financial interest, to be sure, but only in common
with all other stockholders. Therefore, before equity will entertain
a derivative suit, there must be a dear showing that the corporation
6
is unwilling to take action.2
Under normal circumstances a demand must be made upon the
directors.27 It must be an earnest and honest effort to induce them
to assert the rights of the corporation.28 This requirement is reasonable, for the directors are primarily responsible for the management
and direction of corporate affairs. Nevertheless, in some circumstances an exception to this rule will be made when a demand would
be futile,29 for instance, when the majority of directors are wrongdoers or so closely associated with wrongdoers that acquiescence in
0
their activities is certain3
Many jurisdictions also require that a demand be made upon the
stockholders. 31 Happily, however, Florida32 and a few other states
2SSalter v. Columbia Concerts, 191 Misc. 479, 77 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 64 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio App. 1944).
26Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30
S.W.2d 976 (1930); Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 289 N.C. 437, 80 S.E.2d 558 (1954).
27Ibid.
2sQuincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887); Miller v. Murray, 17 Colo. 408, 30 Pac.
46 (1892). This statement also applies to a demand on the shareholders when it
is required.
29Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157 Iowa 75,
155 NAV. 37 (1912); Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P.2d
975 (1948).
30Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Orlando
Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932); Hill v. Erwin Mills,
Inc., supra note 26.
3aFan. R. Crv. P. 25 (b); American Life Ins. Company v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560,
80 So.2d 487 (1955); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theaters
Operation Corp., 526 Mass. 99, 95 N.E.2d 241 (1950); Claman v. Robertson, 164
Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
320rlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, supra note 30. Stone v. Holly Hill Fruit
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do not require this further preliminary step.33 To require a demand on
the shareholders places a tremendous burden upon one seeking to
exercise a corporate right.3' The cost of proxy solicitation alone is
an intolerable burden. In addition, stockholders' meetings are normally held but once a year, which can involve considerable delay. If
fraudulent or ultra vires acts are involved, the shareholders can
ratify only by unanimous vote;35 a demand obviously indicates dissent, so why go through idle formalities? Since the management of
corporate affairs is vested in the directors, why should a demand on
36
the stockholders be required?
The argument favoring the requirement that a demand be made
upon the stockholders involves several parts. First, it is argued that
the shareholders should have an opportunity to replace the directors
who refused to bring actionY.3 Yet, irrespective of the matters in
dispute, the shareholders may not desire to remove directors who
have otherwise performed adequately.38 Also it is doubtful that the
feelings of a majority of directors will differ greatly from the majority
that elected them; therefore, nothing is gained by sounding out the
shareholders. Second, it is contended that shareholders can ratify
fraudulent acts if they feel that it is for corporate benefit to do so.39
Furthermore, the shareholders may feel that it is unwise to sue even
though the corporation has been wronged; this is a decision for the
stockholders. 4 0 However, as the Florida Supreme Court pointed out

Prod., Inc., 56 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1932), decided earlier in the year, was an appeal
from a case tried in a federal district court in Florida involving a Florida corporation. The Stone case, however, was not mentioned by the Florida Supreme Court,
and presumably it would follow the Orlando Orange Groves case on similar facts
today.
33Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtiss, 86 Colo. 355, 281 Pac. 737 (1929);
Reed v. Hollingsworth, supra note 29; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206
N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
34See Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 74, 128 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1955)
(dissenting opinion).
35Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134
A.2d 565 (Del. 1957); Hazard v. Durant, 11 R.I. 195 (1877). But see cases cited
note 31 supra.
360rlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932).
37American Life Ins. Company v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 80 So.2d 487 (1955).
3sContinental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 18 (1912).
39Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
40S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theaters Operation Corp.,
326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
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in Orlando Orange Groves v. Hale,41 these functions are delegated
to the directors, and their decision should be final.
Even in those jurisdictions that require prior request to the shareholders, an exception will be made when (1) there is no opportunity
to make the demand,42 (2) shareholders are too numerous, 43 (3)
application would be futile,44 (4) delay would defeat recovery, 45 or
(5) fraud is alleged.46 Although these exceptions are broad and
sweeping, one cannot be certain that he qualifies under an exception
until suit has been brought and the defendant has moved to dismiss.
The Florida rule of not requiring that a demand be made on the
stockholders differs from the federal rule; 47 this is an important factor
for a shareholder to consider before bringing a derivative suit in
Florida.
Equity JurisdictionalRequirements
The mere fact that the corporation has" a cause of action does
not, ipso facto, make suit mandatory. There may be many times
when the best interests of the corporation would be served by not
exercising its legal rights. The courts are reluctant to substitute their
own judgment for that of the persons who are charged with corporate
responsibility. As a result, in controversies that involve merely a
question of business judgment the suit will be dismissed.48 The classic
statement of what will be recognized by the courts is contained in
Hawes v. Oakland,49 in which the Supreme Court of the United
41107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932), rev'd, 119 Fla. 248, 161 So. 284 (1935).
42United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917);
Hiflar v. Calmac Oil & Gas. Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
43Berg v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 56 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky. 1944). But see
Bruce & Co. v. Bothwell, 8 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
44United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., supra note 42;
Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930); Escoett v. Aldecress
Country Club, 16 NJ. 438, 109 A.2d 277 (1954).
dsUnited Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., supra note 42;
Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 565 (Del. 1957); Escoett v. Aldecress Country
Club, supra note 44.
46See note 35 supra.
47FE0. R. Crv. P. 23 (b) requires that a demand be made on the stockholders
of the corporation in appropriate circumstances.
4sFielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Orlando Orange Groves
Co. v. Hale, infra note 50; Glassberg v. Boyd, 116 A.2d 711 (Del. 1955).
49104 U.S. 450 (1881).
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States stated that a shareholder does not have standing to sue unless
the alleged wrong involves (1) ultra vires acts by the corporation,
(2) fraudulent transactions by those in control, resulting in serious
harm to corporation and shareholders, (3) acts of the directors destructive to the corporation, (4) oppressive and illegal acts of a
majority of the shareholders in the name of the corporation, or (5)
similar injustices demanding equity action.
The Florida Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to follow
the above criteria and has added an additional one: gross misjudgment
or ignorance on the part of directors as to the legal rights of the
corporation that permits, without fraud, illegal misapplication or
waste of corporate funds to the detriment of the corporation and its
stockholders. 50
Motive
As long as the plaintiff is a shareholder and meets the other
prerequisites for suit, his motives for coming to court are usually
held immaterial. 51 However, improper motives in bringing stockholders' derivative suits have prompted preventive legislation. To
avoid the suit brought for personal gain through private settlement,
many jurisdictions now require court approval before dismissal or
settlement; to prevent the suit brought for harassment purposes,
statutes requiring security for costs of suit and ownership of a minimum percentage of shares have been enacted.
Security for Expenses
It is well settled that the plaintiff-shareholder who successfully
concludes suit for the corporation is entitled to reimbursement for
his expenses, including attorney's fees. 52 Even if suit does not go to
final judgment, the plaintiff may still have his expenses paid by the
corporation if a return is induced by institution or pendency of his
suit. 5 3 For example, when the litigation is dismissed by the plaintiff50Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284 (1935).
h1Johnson v. King-Richardson Co., 36 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1930); Eshleman v.
Keenan, 21 Del. Ch. 116, 181 At. 655 (Ch. 1935). But see Wagner Elec. Corp. v.
Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 884 (1934).
52
See Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938),
and the numerous cases cited therein.
S3Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes
Lead Co., 52 Idaho 599, 18 P.2d 288 (1933).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 4
NO TES
shareholder because the defendant-officer, under pressure of suit, returned funds he had illegally taken and for which the litigation had
been instituted, the plaintiff-shareholder can recover his expenses.
Before the security-for-expenses statutes were enacted, the plaintiffshareholder was liable for the taxable costs of litigation,54 though not
for the corporation's or the defendant's expenses. In some states
this has been changed by statutes requiring the plaintiff to post
bond to insure payment of the costs of the defendants. 55 Two approaches have been used; basically both are intended to prevent a
derivative suit brought with improper motives.
The first security-for-expenses statute was passed in New York.56
It applies only to derivative suits in which the holdings of the plaintiff, or plaintiffs collectively, do not exceed five per cent of any one
class of stock or a total evaluation of $50,000. 5 7 If the suitors fall
within this classification, they can be required to post bond to secure
payment of the expenses of the defendant corporation, including attorney's fees incurred as a result of litigation, if the corporation so
requests. 58 The amount of security can be increased or decreased at
the court's discretion during the pendency of the action. One writer
estimated in 1944 that $200,000 security would be a moderate amount
59
in any sizable stockholders' derivative suit.
Another approach has been taken by the California statute, which
requires the posting of security only if the defendant or the corporation is able to show the probability that the corporation will not
benefit from the action. If the court concludes a probability of
corporate benefit as to some defendants but not as to others, the
54McArthur v. John McArthur Co., 39 Cal. App. 704, 179 Pac. 700 (1919);
Alexander v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 113 Ga. 193, 38 S.E. 772 (1901); cf. Burley
Tobacco Co. v. Vest, 165 Ky. 762, 178 S.W. 1102 (1915). However, a plaintiff who
intervenes as a party after suit has begun is not chargeable with expenses accruing before he intervenes. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915).
5SCAL. CORP. CODE §834

(1953); MD. R. PRoc. 328

(1958); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§14:3-15 (Supp. 1958); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw §61 (b) (Supp. 1958); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §22 (Supp. 1950).
56N.Y. Laws 1944, c. 668.
7Pennsylvania follows the 5% standard only; New Jersey differs only in requiring 5% of all outstanding shares of every class; Maryland has a $25,000 limit
instead of $50,000; but, if the plaintiff is a nonresident, security may be required
regardless of the plaintiff's holdings.
58The expenses include the corporation's duty to reimburse directors and officers

for expenses in the event that they successfully defend the suit.
59See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CALIF. L. Rlv. 123 (1944).
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plaintiff is given the choice of posting security as to those defendants
or having his suit dismissed as to them only. This differs from New
York, where the whole action is dismissed if bond is not given. Another difference between the two types of statutes is that California's
statute applies equally to all plaintiffs, regardless of the amount of
stock owned. In New York motion for security can be made at any
time; in California it must be made within thirty days after institution of suit.
This type of legislation is designed to prevent "strike" suits brought
by the stockholder to harass management or for personal financial
gain without any desire to benefit the corporation. Unfortunately,
in New York, not only has this purpose been achieved but the stockholders' derivative suit has been virtually eliminated as the result
of the cost of furnishing security for expenses. 60 Florida has no such
statute.
After the enactment of these statutes the question was raised as
to whether they were applicable in federal courts in diversity cases.
The United States Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corporation," concluded that the statutes are substantive in
effect and thus applicable in diversity of citizenship cases in federal
courts under the Erie doctrine.
PROBLEMS IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE NECESSARY PARTIES

The theory of the stockholders' derivative suit is that the litigation
is instituted for the corporation on the corporate cause of action, with
the benefits flowing to it. In order to make the cause of action res
judicata as to the corporation and thereby prevent double liability
for the defendants, it is mandatory that the corporation be joined in
the action.62 The corporation is regarded as adverse to the plaintiff's
cause as a result of the demand made upon it to assert its cause of

6oSee 27 IND. L.J. 231, n.7 (1951), for the applicable statistics.

61337 U.S. 541 (1949).
62
See 13 Am. JUR., Corporations §466, n.5, and cases cited therein. But see
Kidd v. New Hampshire Tractor Co., 72 N.H. 273, 56 At. 465 (1903); Weinert v.
Kinkel, 296 N.Y. 151, 71 N.E.2d 445 (1947). In both cases the court did not require joinder of the corporation, which was dissolved or in the process of dissolution. However, in Florida, under the provisions of FLA. STAT. §608.30 (1957), the
corporation is continued for 3 years after dissolution for the purpose of prosecution
and defense of suits.
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action, and it is joined and served as a defendant even though it will
63
receive any benefit that should accrue.
The plaintiff-shareholder must find both the corporation and the
real defendants 64 - those who have harmed the corporation- in the
same state in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over them. This
will frequently be impossible; since the wrongdoers will want to
avoid suit and the corporation will not voluntarily appear, the suitor
will receive no help from them. The problem that arises is one of
vindicating a wrong when two necessary defendants are in different
jurisdictions.
One partial solution of the problem is available when grounds
for federal diversity jurisdiction are met. Congress has provided that
a stockholder may sue the real defendant in a derivative suit in any
district in which the corporation could sue the same defendant, providing the requirements of diversity are fulfilled.65 It has further been
provided that service of process on the corporation in that same suit
will run throughout the United States into any district in which the
corporation is organized, licensed to do business, or is doing business.66
What are the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction? The
accepted statement of these requirements was made in Indianapolis
7
v. Chase National Bank:6
"To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an 'actual,' .. .
'substantial,' ... controversy between citizens of different states,
all of whom on one side of the controversy are citizens of different states from all parties on the other side."
When the corporation and the real defendants are in different states
and the plaintiff-shareholder is a resident of a third state,68 the plaintiff can sue the real defendant at the place of his residence and obtain
63Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
64H-owever, the plaintiff-shareholder need not join all those who have wronged
the corporation. Kidd v. New Hampshire Tractor Co., supra note 62; Berry v.
Moeller, 68 N.J. Eq. 483, 59 At. 97 (Ch. 1904).
8528 U.S.C. §1401 (1952).
661d. §1695.
67314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
GsIf the plaintiff is in the same jurisdiction with either the corporation or the
real defendant, grounds for diversity are not established. All parties plaintiff must
be citizens of different states from all parties defendant. If the two defendants are
in the same jurisdiction, there is no need for these special provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§§1401, 1695 (1952), as both can be served by normal state or federal procedures.
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jurisdiction over the corporation by extraterritorial service. The
only time it is impossible to join all the parties necessary for a shareholders' derivative suit is when the plaintiff resides in the same state as
either the corporation or the wrongdoing director or officer, but not
both.
DEFENSES TO THE SHAREHOLDERS' SUIT

Besides failure to meet the prerequisites to suit, the defendants
may plead in bar (1) res judicata, (2) acquiesence, (3) laches, (4)
statute of limitations, (5) forum non conveniens, or (6) good motives
in refusing to bring suit.
If the corporation has obtained a judgment on its own cause of
action prior to a stockholders' derivative suit on the same cause, the
judgment clearly bars the stockholders' suit. Likewise, if a shareholder has sued to judgment in a derivative suit, it also is a bar to
further suits.69 If a suit has been dismissed or settled, the determina-

tion is also res judicata if the procedures of the jurisdictions have
been followed. 70
The shareholder who has knowledge of certain ultra vires acts
of officers and does not object to them may well find that he has lost
his right to complain because of his acquiescence. 71 If he has this
knowledge and does not pursue his remedies promptly, even though
he does not 3 acquiesce he may be barred by laches72 or the statute of
limitations .7
Forum non conveniens has been raised in at least one federal case,
brought in New York by a New York resident against an Illinois
corporation and Illinois directors. 74 In a five-to-four decision, the
United States Supreme Court found that most of the plaintiff's evidence and witnesses were in Illinois, as were the defendant's. The
69Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916); Willoughby v. Chicago Junction
Rys. and Union Stockyards Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 277 (Ch. 1892); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885).
7OStella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Dana v. Morgan, supra note 69;
Milvey v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S.2d 881 (County Ct. 1939).
7lRedstone v. Redstone Lumber ScSupply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 133 So. 882 (1931).
72Bryne v. Schuyler Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336, 31 Atl. 833 (1895); Tanner
v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904).
7

aBrensinger v. Margaret Ann

Super Markets, Inc.,

192 F.2d 458

(5th Cir.

1951) (statute of limitations held to be 3 years in Florida on allegation of fraud).
74Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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cause was dismissed; the plaintiff should have brought suit in Illinois.
Another defense in bar of a stockholders' derivative suit is a plea of
good motives on the part of the defendants in refusing to bring suit.
The Florida Supreme Court, quoting Morawetz's Private Corporations,
has stated this defense as follows: 75
"'A very wide discretion is necessarily reposed in the directors of a corporation.... So a suit might appear so desperate,
or be so expensive, or, for good reasons impolitic, that creditors
might, in the exercise of a sound discretion, deem it unwise to
engage in litigation. In such case, if the refusal be in good
faith, the courts will rarely suffer a shareholder to overturn such
decision by entertaining his suit for the same cause of action.'
PROBLEMS IN HANDLING LITIGATION
Joinder of Corporationfor Purposesof FederalDiversity
When the corporation and officers sued in a derivative suit are
domiciliaries of the same state, the question of whether the corporation should be joined as a plaintiff or as a defendant becomes important. If the plaintiff-shareholder resides in another state and desires to bring suit in federal court on diversity of citizenship, the
corporation must be made a defendant or the shareholder will lose his
76
right to sue in federal court.
In absence of collusion, mere refusal by the corporation to sue
is sufficient controversy and antagonism to join the corporation as a
party defendant. 77 Prior to 1957 the requirements were more stringent; it was necessary for defendants to have engaged in fraud or
illegal activity to be antagonistic for this purpose.78 However, in that
year the United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
reversed this rule, which had stood for fifty-two years. 79 The result of
this new rule is to make the federal courts more accessible to plaintiffs
in a stockholders' derivative suit.
It should be remembered that federal diversity jurisdiction can75Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 169, 161 So. 284, 289 (1935).
76Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3Cranch) 267 (1806). If the corporation is
joined as a plaintiff, all plaintiffs will not be citizens of different states from all
defendants, since the corporation and officers are citizens of the same state.
77Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
7"Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
7"Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 98 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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not be conferred by collusion.80 When the corporation wants to liti-

gate in the federal courts and the defendant is in the same jurisdiction, it is improper for the corporation to have a nonresident shareholder sue in its place. In fact, the plaintiff-shareholder must allege
in his complaint that the action is not collusive for purposes of conferring federal jurisdictions1
Once the requirements of diversity are met, subsequent events
during pendency of the suit will not divest federal jurisdiction.82
Thus, if a plaintiff-shareholder is a citizen of New York, the defendant directors are citizens of California, and the corporation is
domiciled in Delaware, when the plaintiff dies and a California administrator is appointed the case continues in federal court even
83
though there are California residents on both sides.
Multiple Suits
On occasion two or more derivative suits are begun by different
shareholders at the same time on the same cause of action. This fact
alone is not sufficient for dismissal of any of the causes,8 4 though one
may be stayed during the pendency of the other.8 5 It would indeed
be unwise to dismiss one cause, for after the statute of limitations had
run the other suit might be dropped or might result in a private
settlement and the cause might not be diligently prosecuted.
An even better solution for multiple suits than staying one while
the other continues is consolidation.16 This relieves the defendant
of the burden of defending several suits, gives all the plaintiffs a
voice in the direction of the cause, and tends to prevent the plaintiff in one suit and the defendant from settling cheaply, thus making
the cause res judicata.
The right to intervene in a suit already pending would also protect the rights of other shareholders. In a shareholders' derivative
suit the right is generally granted unless the litigation has been disSODetroit v. Dean, 106 U.S. 537 (1882).
sSFED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b); Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887).

B2Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824).
S3Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
84Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Dresdner v. Goldman
Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1934).
S5Milvy v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S.2d 881 (County Ct. 1939); Goodbody v. Delaney, 80 N.J. Eq. 417, 419, 83 At. 988, 989 (Ch. 1912) (dictum).
s61bid.
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missed before the shareholder acts to intervene 7 or equities of the
situation prevent intervention.,$ After intervention, the original
plaintiff continues to control the litigation unless he fails to prosecute
with vigor and reasonable capacity or desires not to proceed further;
the suit cannot be dismissed or compromised without the intervenor's
permission.8 9
Dismissaland Settlement
A shareholders' derivative suit can be dismissed on its merits without any special notice to shareholders; 90 it is a different matter when
dismissal is voluntary. 91 Normally a voluntary dismissal follows a
prior settlement, private or court-approved, between the parties. One
of the abuses of derivative suits which arose early was the extortion
suit. Often the litigation was not brought in good faith and for
the corporation's benefit but primarily in the hope that the real
defendants would buy the plaintiff off with a private settlement for
the plaintiff's benefit - a definite perversion of the derivative suit idea
designed to benefit the corporation. A common form which private
settlement takes is sale of shares above the market price. 92 To prevent
this, many states93 and the federal courts 94 require court approval of
settlements; the court-approved settlement will be paid to the corporation and not to the plaintiff-shareholder. Failure to obtain the
court's approbation will make the plaintiff liable for any sum he
wrongfully receives. 95
Unfortunately some states do not require court approval and
S7White v. British Type Investors, Inc., 130 N.J. Eq. 157, 21 A.2d 681 (Ch.

1941).
SSlbid.; Keller v. Wilson & Co., 22 Del. Ch. 175, 178, 194 At. 45, 47 (Ch. 1937)
(dictum).
s9White v. British Type Investors, Inc., 130 NJ. Eq. 157, 21 A.2d 681 (Ch.

1941).
9OMassaro v. Fisk Rubber Corp., 36 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1941).
91FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c); DEL. CH. R. 23 (c); COLO. R. Civ. P. 23 (c). But see
Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp.
360 (2d Dep't 1934).
92Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945); Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d
Cir. 1951); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
93DEL. CH. R. 23 (b); COLO. R. Civ. P. 23 (c); N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:36-3; PA. R. Civ.

P. 2230 (b); TEx. R. Crv. P. 42 (c).
94FrD.

R. Civ. P. 23 (b).

95See cases cited note 92 supra.
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allow the settling plaintiff to keep his return.98 Florida has not ruled
on this particular question. When approval is required, it will be
granted when settlement is adequate and fair to all concerned; 97 approval of counsel alone is not enough. 8 The court will look to see
that no fraud or collusion has been practiced in its consummation.
The probabilities and possibilities of victory or defeat are also important factors11
Rights of the CorporationAs a Party
There has been little litigation on the rights of a corporation as
a party. Usually it is referred to merely as a nominal party. At least
one decision, however, has allowed an appeal when the corporation
was aggrieved by the decision.100 If the matter appealed from actually
benefits the corporation, such as the overruling of a demurrer to the
plaintiff's complaint, the right to appeal should be, and probably
will be, denied. 1°1
CONCLUSION

Throughout this note the federal procedures have been compared
with those used in the various states, including Florida. It should
be noted that there are only two essential differences between Florida
and federal procedure: (1) federal practice requires a troublesome and
unnecessary demand on the shareholders in addition to the directors,
and (2) federal practice makes service of process possible when the
plaintiff, the defendant-officers, and the corporations are all domiciliaries of different jurisdictions.
There are several problems connected with stockholders' derivative suits that have received judicial and legislative notice. Particular
attention has been focused on ways to prevent "strike suits" brought
for harassment or selfish purposes rather than for corporate benefit.
96Barnheim v. Wallace, 186 Ky. 459, 217 S.W. 916 (1920); Keller v. Wilson &
Co., 22 Del. Ch. 175, 178, 194 Atl. 45, 47 (Ch. 1937) (dictum) (other shareholders
not barred, however).
9
7Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942); Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp.
137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15 (County Ct. 1943).
98Ibid.
99Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
1OoMcHarg v. Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 44 S.D. 144, 182 N.W. 705 (1921).
lolKaiser v. Niemeyer, 198 Wis. 581, 225 N.W. 188 (1929).
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